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Abstract
In an online contract selection problem there is a seller which offers a set of contracts to sequentially
arriving buyers whose types are drawn from an unknown distribution. If there exists a profitable contract
for the buyer in the offered set, i.e., a contract with payoff higher than the payoff of not accepting any
contracts, the buyer chooses the contract that maximizes its payoff. In this paper we consider the online
contract selection problem to maximize the sellers profit. Assuming that a structural property called
ordered preferences holds for the buyer’s payoff function, we propose online learning algorithms that
have sub-linear regret with respect to the best set of contracts given the distribution over the buyer’s
type. This problem has many applications including spectrum contracts, wireless service provider data
plans and recommendation systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an online contract selection problem there is a seller who offers a bundle of contracts to buyers
arriving sequentially over time. The goal of the seller is to maximize its total expected profit up to the
final time T , by learning the best bundle of contracts to offer. However, the seller does not know the
best bundle of contracts beforehand because initially it does not know the preferences of the buyers.
Assuming that the buyers’ preferences change stochastically over time, our goal in this paper is to
design learning algorithms for the seller to maximize its expected profit. Specifically, we assume that
the preferences of a buyer depends on its type, and is given by a payoff function depending on the type
of the buyer. The type of the buyer at time step t is drawn from a distribution not known by the seller,
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2independently from the other time steps. Obviously, the best bundle of contracts (which maximizes the
sellers expected profit) depends on the distribution of the buyers’ type and the preferences of the buyers.
We assume that the seller can choose what to offer from a continuum of contracts, but it should choose
a finite number of contracts to offer simultaneously. We show that if the buyers’ payoff function has a
special property which we call the ordered preferences property, then there exists learning algorithms for
the seller by which the seller can estimate the type distribution of the buyers by offering contracts and
observing the contracts that are accepted by the buyers. Then, the seller can compute the expected payoff
of different bundles of contracts using the estimated type distribution.
The online contract selection problem can be viewed as a combinatorial multi-armed bandit problem,
where each arm is a vector (bundle) of contracts, and each component of the vector can be chosen from
an interval of the real line. Two aspects that make this problem harder than the classical multi-armed
bandit problem are: (i) uncountable number of contracts; (ii) exponential number of arms in the number
of contracts. We can overcome (i) by offering bundles of sufficiently closely spaced contracts to form
an estimate of the distribution of buyer’s type, and (ii) by writing the expected payoff of an arm as a
function of the expected payoffs of the contracts in that arm. Exploiting the structure of the problem, we
prove sublinear regret bounds which scale linearly in the dimension m.
The online learning problem we consider in this paper involves large strategy sets, combinatorial and
contextual elements. Problems with a continuum of arms are considered in [1], [2], [3], [4], where
sub-linear regret results are derived. Several combinatorial bandit problems are studied in [5], [6], and
problems involving stochastic linear optimization are considered in [7], [8]. Another line of work [9]
generalized the continuum armed bandits to bandits on metric spaces. In this setting, the difference
between the expected payoffs of a pair of arms is related to the distance between the arms via a similarity
metric. Contextual bandits, in which context information is provided to the algorithm at each round is
studied in [10], [11]. The goal there is to learn the best arm, given the context.
Many applications can be modeled using our online contract selection framework. For instance, the
bundles of contracts can be viewed as wireless service provider data plans from which the users make
selections based on their needs, or they can be viewed as recommendations in a recommender system
such as airline tickets, hotels, rental cars, etc., where each recommendation has a rating that encodes its
price and quality.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we define the contract selection
problems, the ordered preferences property, and provide three applications of the problem. We propose
a contract learning algorithm with variable number of simultaneous offers at each time step in Section
3III, and analyze its performance in Section IV. Then, we consider a variant of this algorithm with fixed
number of offers in Section V. Finally, we discuss the similarities and the differences between our work
and the related work in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
In an online contract selection problem there is a seller who offers a bundle of m ∈ {1, 2, . . .} contracts
x ∈ Xm, where
Xm := {(x1, x2, . . . , xm), such that xi ∈ (0, 1], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, xi ≤ xi+1} ,
to buyers arriving sequentially at time steps t = 1, 2, . . . , T , where T is the time horizon. Let x(t) be
the bundle offered by the seller at time t. The buyer can accept a single contract y ∈ x(t) and pay y to
the seller, or it can reject all of the offered contracts and pay 0 to the seller. Profit of the seller by time
T is
T∑
t=1
(u(t)− c(t)),
where u(t) represents the revenue/payoff of the seller at time t and c(t) is any cost associated with
offering the contracts at time t. We have u(t) = x if contract x is accepted by the buyer at time t,
u(t) = 0 if none of the offered contracts at time t is accepted by the buyer at time t.
The buyer who arrives at time t has type θt which encodes its preferences into a payoff function.
At each time step, the type of the buyer present at that time step is drawn according to the probability
density function f(θ) on [0, 1] independently from the other time steps. We assume that buyer’s type
density is bounded, i.e.
fmax := sup
θ∈[0,1]
f(θ) <∞.
Neither θt nor f(θ) is known by the seller at any time. Therefore, in order maximize its profit, the seller
should learn the best set of contracts over time. The expected profit of the seller over time horizon T is
given by
E
[
T∑
t=1
u(t)− c(t)
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to buyer’s type distribution f(θ) and the seller’s contract
offering strategy. Our goal in this paper is to develop online learning algorithms for the seller to maximize
its expected profit over time horizon T .
4Let Ub(x, θ) : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R represent the payoff function of type θ buyer, which is a function of
the contract accepted by the buyer. We assume that the seller knows Ub. For example, when the contracts
represent data plans of wireless service providers, the service provider can know the worth of a 2 GB
contract to a buyer who only needs 1 GB each month. For instance, the amount of payment for the 2
GB contract that exceeds the payment for a 1 GB can represent the loss of the buyer. Similarly, a 500
MB contract to a buyer who needs 1 GB a month can have a cost equal to the 500 MB shortage in data.
Of course there should be a way to relate the monetary loss with the data loss, which can be captured
by coefficients multiplying these two. These coefficients can also be known by the seller by analyzing
previous buyer data.
Based on its payoff function, the buyer either selects a contract from the offered bundle or it may
reject all of the contracts in the bundle. If x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) is offered to a type θ buyer, it will
accept a contract randomly from the set
argmax
x∈{0,x1,...,xm}
Ub(x, θ),
where x = 0 implies that the buyer does not accept any of the offered contracts. Since the seller knows
the buyer’s payoff function Ub(x, θ), for a given bundle of contracts x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm), it can compute
which contracts will be accepted as a function of the buyer’s type. For y ∈ x, let Iy(x) be the acceptance
region of contract y, which is the values of θ for which contact y will be accepted from the bundle x
(usually an interval of the real line). For two intervals of the real line I1 and I2, I1 < I2 means that
the rightmost point of I1 is less than or equal to the leftmost point of I2. We assume that the buyers
payoff function induces ordered preferences, which means that for a bundle of contracts (x1, . . . , xm),
the values of θ for which xi is accepted only depends on xi−1, xi and xi+1, and
Ixi−1(x) < Ixi(x) < Ixi+1(x),
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}, which means that the acceptance regions are ordered.
Assumption 1: Ordered Preferences. Ub(x, θ) induces ordered preferences which means that for any
x ∈ X , Ixi(x) = (g(xi−1, xi), g(xi, xi+1)]. The function g is such that g(x, y) < g(y, z) for x < y < z,
and g is Ho¨lder continuous with constant L and exponent α, i.e.,
|g(x1, x2)− g(y1, y2)| ≤ L
√
(|x1 − y1|2 + |x2 − y2|2)α.
Although the assumption on Ub(x, θ) is implicit, it is satisfied by many common payoff functions. Below
we provide several examples. For notational convenience for any bundle of contracts (x1, x2, . . . , xm),
let x0 = 0, xm+1 = 1 and g(xm, 1) = 1.
5Fig. 1. acceptance region of bundle (x1, . . . , xm) for Ub(x, θ) = h(a(x− θ)+ + b(θ − x)+)
Example 1: Wireless Data Plan Contract. A wireless user’s goal is to have a certain video/audio
quality and download/upload quota. For a wireless user with type θ, it is intuitive to assume that (x−θ)+
corresponds to loss in accepting a contract which offers data less than the demand, while (θ − x)+
corresponds to loss in accepting a contract x which offers data more than the demand but have a higher
price than the price of the demanded data service. Tradeoff between these two is captured by coefficients
that relate the buyers weighting of these losses. Therefore we assume that the buyer’s payoff function is
given by
Ub(x, θ) := h(a(x− θ)+ + b(θ − x)+),
where
(x− y)+ = max{0, x− y},
and h : R+ → R is a decreasing function. For data plan contracts, For this payoff function, the accepted
contract from any bundle (x1, x2, . . . , xm) of contracts is given as a function of the buyer’s type in Figure
1. It is easy to check that the boundaries of the acceptance regions are
g(xi−1, xi) =
bxi−1 + axi
a+ b
, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Since
|g(x1, x2)− g(y1, y2)| =
∣∣∣∣b(x1 − y1)a+ b + a(x2 − y2)a+ b
∣∣∣∣
≤ max{|x1 − y1|, |x2 − y2|}
≤
√
|x1 − y1|2 + |x2 − y2|2,
Assumption 1 holds for this buyer payoff function with L = 1 and α = 1.
Example 2: Secondary Spectrum Contract. Consider a secondary spectrum market, where the service
provider leases excess spectrum to secondary users. For simplicity, assume that the service provider always
have a unit bandwidth available. In general, due to the primary user activity the bandwidth available for
6leasing at time t is Bt ∈ [0, 1], however, all our results in this paper will hold for dynamically changing
available bandwidth, provided that the seller pays a penalty to the buyers for any bandwidth it offers
but cannot guarantee to a buyer. By this way, the seller can still learn the buyer’s type distribution by
offering a bundle of contracts x for which there is some xi > Bt. The buyer’s payoff function in this
case is
Ub(x, θ) := −a(θ − x)+ − x,
where x is the amount of money that the buyer pays to the seller by accepting contract x and a > 1 is a
coefficient that relates the tradeoff between the loss in data and monetary loss. For this payoff function
it can be shown that the acceptance region boundaries are
g(xi−1, xi) =
(a− 1)xi−1 + xi
a
, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
and Assumption 1 holds with L = 1, α = 1.
Example 3: Recommendation System. Consider a recommendation system where the recommender
makes m recommendations to each arriving user. For instance these recommendations can be flights,
hotels, etc. Each recommendation has a rating x ∈ [0, 1] which reflects some weighted average of quality
and price. Based on its (unknown) type θ (budget, preferences, etc.) a user either chooses one of the
recommendations or it does not accept any. For example, type of the user may represent its preferred
rating, and the user may only accept a recommendation if its rating is within (θ−, θ+) for some small
 > 0. Note that this user preference satisfies the ordered preferences property given in Assumption 1
where
Ixi(x) = I(xi ∈ (θ − , θ + ) and xi closest in x to θ)1
Note that although we do not require the Ho¨lder condition to hold here, our analysis throughout the
paper hold for this type of user preference as well. Whenever a user chooses a recommendation, the
recommender obtains reward 1. The goal of the recommender is to maximize the number of sales.
Above examples show that our contract selection framework has a large set of applications. By
Assumption 1, the expected payoff of a bundle of contracts x ∈ Xm to the seller is
U(x) = x1P (g(0, x1) < θ ≤ g(x1, x2)) + x2P (g(x1, x2) < θ ≤ g(x2, x3))
+ . . .+ xmP (g(xm−1, xm) < θ).
7Fig. 2. acceptance region of bundle (x1, . . . , xm) for Ub(x, θ) = −a(θ − x)+ − x
Note that the seller’s problem would be solved if it knew f(θ), since it could compute the best bundle
of m contracts, i.e.,
argmax
x∈Xm
U(x). (1)
Remark 1: We do not require that the maximizer of (1) is a bundle of m distinct contracts. Note that
by definition of the set Xm, the maximizer of (1) may be a bundle (x1, . . . , xm) for which xi = xi+1 for
some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m−1}. This is equivalent to offering m−1 contracts (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+2, . . . , xm).
Indeed, our results hold when the seller’s goal is to learn the best bundle of contracts that have at most
m contracts in it.
The key idea behind the learning algorithms we design for the seller in the subsequent sections is
to form estimates of the buyer’s type distribution by offering different sets of contracts. Each algorithm
consists of exploration and exploitation phases. Although we stated that the seller offers m contracts
at each time step, in our first algorithm m will vary over time (two different values for m; one for
exploration, one for exploitation), so we denote it by m(t). In our second algorithm m will be fixed
throughout the time horizon T .
We also assume that the cost of offering m contracts at the same time is given by c(m), which increases
with m. For example, in a recommendation system, the buyer can get confused when there is a huge
list of recommendations, for wireless service providers the regulatory costs increase with the number
of different plans offered, etc. The seller’s objective of maximizing the profit over time horizon T is
equivalent to minimizing the regret which is given by
Ralg(T ) = T (U(x∗)− c(m))− Ealg
[
T∑
t=1
r(x(t))− c(m(t))
]
, (2)
where
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈Xm
U(x), (3)
8is the optimal set of m contracts, r(x(t)) is the payoff of the seller from the bundle offered at time t, and
“alg” is the learning algorithm used by the seller. We will drop the superscript “alg” when the algorithm
used by the seller is clear from the context. Note that for any algorithm with sublinear regret, the time
averaged expected profit will converge to U(x∗)− c(m).
III. A LEARNING ALGORITHM WITH VARIABLE NUMBER OF OFFERS
In this section we present a learning algorithm which sequences time steps into exploration and
exploitation steps, and uses the exploration steps to learn about the buyer’s type distribution while using
the exploitation steps to offer best bundle of contracts. The algorithm is called type learning with variable
number of offers (TLVO), whose pseudocode is given in Figure 3.
Instead of searching for the best bundle of contracts in Xm which is uncountable, the algorithm searches
for the best bundle of contracts in the finite set
Lm,T := {x = (x1, . . . xm) : xi ≤ xi+1 and xi ∈ KT ,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} ,
where
KT :=
{
1
nT
,
2
nT
, . . . ,
nT − 1
nT
}
.
Here nT is a non-decreasing function of the time horizon T . Since the best bundle in Lm,T might have
an expected reward smaller than the expected reward of the best bundle in Xm, in order to bound the
regret due to this difference sublinearly over time, nT should be adjusted according to the time horizon.
Exploration and exploitation steps are sequenced in a deterministic way. This sequencing is provided
by a control function z(t) which is a parameter of the learning algorithm. Let N(t) be the number of
explorations up to time t. If N(t) < z(t), time t will be an exploration step. Otherwise time t will be
an exploitation step. While z(t) can be any sublinearly increasing function, we will optimize over z(t)
in our analysis.
In an exploration step, TLVO estimates the distribution of buyer’s type by simultaneously offering the
set of nT − 1 uniformly spaced contracts in KT . Based on the accepted contract at time t, the seller
learns the part of the type space that the buyers type at t lies in, and uses this to form sample mean
estimates of the distribution of the buyer’s type. An example is shown in Figure 4. We simply call the
contract i/nT ∈ KT as the ith contract. Let θ be the unknown type of the buyer at some exploration
step. If ith contract is accepted by the buyer, then the seller knows that
g
(
i− 1
nT
,
i
nT
)
< θ ≤ g
(
i
nT
,
i+ 1
nT
)
.
9Type Learning with Variable Number of Offers (TLVO)
1: Parameters: m, T , z(t), 1 ≤ t ≤ T , nT , KT , Lm,T .
2: Initialize: set t = 1, N = 0, µi = 0, Ni = 0, ∀i ∈ KT .
3: while t ≥ 1 do
4: if N < z(t) then
5: EXPLORE
6: Offer all contracts in KT simultaneously.
7: if Any contract x ∈ KT is accepted by the buyer then
8: Get reward x. Find k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nT − 1} such that k/nT = x.
9: ++Nk.
10: end if
11: ++N .
12: else
13: EXPLOIT
14: µi = Ni/N,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nT − 1}.
15: Offer bundle x = (x1, . . . , xm), which is a solution to (4) based on µi’s.
16: If some x ∈ x is accepted, get reward x.
17: end if
18: ++ t.
19: end while
Fig. 3. pseudocode of TLVO
Let Ni(t) be the number of times contract i is accepted in an exploration step up to t. Then the sample
mean estimate of
P
(
g
(
i− 1
nT
,
i
nT
)
< θ ≤ g
(
i
nT
,
i+ 1
nT
))
,
is given by
µi(t) :=
Ni(t)
N(t)
.
In an exploitation step, TLVO offers a bundle of m contracts chosen from Lm,T , which maximizes
the seller’s estimated expected payoff. For constants θl and θu, let Pˆt(θl < θ ≤ θu) be the estimate of
10
Fig. 4. an illustration of the sample mean update of buyer’s type distribution when contract i is accepted at time t
P (θl < θ ≤ θu) at time t. TLVO computes this estimate based on the estimates µi(t) in the following
way:
Pˆt(θl < θ ≤ θu) =
j+(θu)∑
i=j−(θl)
µi(t),
where
j−(θl) = min
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , nT − 1} such that g
(
i− 1
nT
,
i
nT
)
≥ θl
}
,
and
j+(θu) = min
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , nT − 1} such that g
(
i
nT
,
i+ 1
nT
)
≥ θu
}
.
We can write xi ∈ Lm,T as ki/nT for some ki ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nT − 1}. If time t is an exploitation
step, TLVO computes the estimated best bundle of contracts x(t) by solving the following optimization
problem.
x(t) = argmax
x∈Lm,T
Uˆt(x), (4)
where
Uˆt(x) := x1Pˆt (g(0, x1) < θ ≤ g(x1, x2)) + x2Pˆt (g(x1, x2) < θ ≤ g(x2, x3))
+ . . .+ xmPˆt (g(xm−1, xm) < θ) .
Note that there might be more than one maximizer to (4). In such a case, TLVO arbitrarily chooses one of
the maximizer bundles. Maximization in (4) is a combinatorial optimization problem. In general solution
to such a problem is NP-hard. We assume that the solution is provided to the algorithm by an oracle.
This is a common assumption in online learning literature, for example used in [8]. Therefore, we do not
consider the computational complexity of this operation. Although we do not provide a computationally
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efficient solution for (4), there exists computationally efficient methods for some special cases. We discuss
more on this in Section VI.
We analyze the regret of TLVO in the next section.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE REGRET OF TLVO
In this section we upper bound the regret of TLVO. Let
S = {x ∈ Lm,T : |U(x∗)− U(x)| < βn−αT },
be the set of near-optimal bundles of contracts where α is the Ho¨lder exponent in Assumption 1, and
β = 5mfmaxL2
α/2 is a constant where L is the Ho¨lder constant in Assumption 1. Denote the complement
of S on Lm,T , i.e., Lm,T−S, by Sc. Let Tx(t) be the number of times x ∈ Lm,T is offered at exploitation
steps by time t. For TLVO, regret given in (2) is upper bounded by
R(T ) ≤
∑
x∈S
(U(x∗)− U(x))E [Tx(T )]
+
∑
x∈Sc
(U(x∗)− U(x))E [Tx(T )]
+N(T )(U(x∗) + c(nT )− c(m)), (5)
by assuming zero worst-case payoff in exploration steps. First term in (5) is the contribution of selecting
a nearly optimal bundle of contracts in exploitation steps, second term is the contribution of selecting a
suboptimal bundle of contracts in the exploitation steps, and the third term is the worst-case contribution
during the exploration steps to the regret.
The following theorem gives an upper bound on the regret of TLVO.
Theorem 1: The regret of the seller using TLVO with time horizon T is upper bounded by
R(T ) ≤ 5mfmaxL2α/2n−αT (T −N(T )) +N(T )(U(x∗) + c(nT )− c(m))
+ 2nT
T∑
t=1
e
−f2maxL22αN(t)
n
2+2α
T .
Remark 2: In this form, the regret is linear in nT and T . The first term in the regret decreases with nT
while the second and third terms increase with nT . Since T is known by the seller, nT can be optimized
as a function of T .
Proof: Let δ∗x = U(x∗)− U(x). By definition of the set S, we have∑
x∈S
δ∗xE[Tx(T )] ≤ max
x∈S
δ∗x
∑
x∈S
E[Tx(T )]
≤ βn−αT (T −N(T )). (6)
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Next, we consider the term ∑
x∈Sc
(U(x∗)− U(x))E [Tx(T )] .
Note that even if we bound E [Tx(T )] for all x ∈ Sc, in the worst case |Sc| = cnmT , for some c > 0.
Therefore a bound that depends on nmT will scale badly for large m. To overcome this difficulty, we will
show that if the distribution function has sufficiently accurate sample mean estimates µi(t) for all
pi := P
(
g
(
i− 1
nT
,
i
nT
)
< θ ≤ g
(
i
nT
,
i+ 1
nT
))
, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nT − 1},
then the probability that some bundle in Sc is offered will be small. Let TSc(t) be the number of times
a bundle from Sc is offered in exploitation steps by time t. Since for any x ∈ Xm, U(x) ≤ 1, we have∑
x∈Sc
(U(x∗)− U(x))E [Tx(T )] ≤ E [TSc(T )] , (7)
where
E [TSc(T )] = E
[
T∑
t=1
I(x(t) ∈ Sc)
]
=
T∑
t=1
P (x(t) ∈ Sc). (8)
For convenience let x0 = 0, xm+1 = 1 and g(xm, xm + 1) = 1. For any xi ∈ x ∈ Lm,T , we can write
P (g(xi−1, xi) < θ ≤ g(xi, xi+1)) = P (g(xi−1, xi) < θ ≤ j−(g(xi−1, xi)))
+
j+(g(xi,xi+1))∑
i=j−(g(xi−1,xi))
pi
− P (g(xi, xi+1) < θ ≤ j+(g(xi, xi+1))).
Let
errx(xi) = |P (g(xi−1, xi) < θ ≤ j−(g(xi−1, xi)))
−P (g(xi, xi+1) < θ ≤ j+(g(xi, xi+1))) |.
Figure 5 shows the decomposition of P (g(xi−1, xi) < θ ≤ g(xi, xi+1)) in terms of the acceptance
regions defined by contracts in Lm,T and the error terms. It is easy to see from Figure 5 that(
g(xi−1, xi),
j−(g(xi−1, xi))
nT
]
⊂
(
j−(g(xi−1, xi))− 1
nT
,
j−(g(xi−1, xi))
nT
]
,
and (
g(xi, xi+1),
j+(g(xi, xi+1))
nT
]
⊂
(
j+(g(xi, xi+1))− 1
nT
,
j+(g(xi, xi+1))
nT
]
.
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Fig. 5. decomposition of P (g(xi−1, xi) < θ ≤ g(xi, xi+1))
Then, by Assumption 1, we have for any xi ∈ x ∈ Lm,T
errx(xi)
≤ max{P (g(xi−1, xi) < θ ≤ j−(g(xi−1, xi))), P (g(xi, xi+1) < θ ≤ j+(g(xi, xi+1)))}
≤ fmaxL2α/2n−αT . (9)
Consider the event
ξt =
nT−1⋂
i=1
{
|µi(t)− pi| ≤ (β −mfmaxL2
α/2)n−αT
4nTm
}
.
If ξt happens, then for any 1 ≤ a < b ≤ nT − 1∣∣∣∣∣
b∑
i=a
µi(t)−
b∑
i=a
pi(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (b− a)(β −mfmaxL2α/2)n−αT4nTm
≤ (β −mfmaxL2
α/2)n−αT
4m
,
which implies that for any x ∈ Lm,T
|Uˆt(x)− U(x)| ≤ x1
j+(g(x1,x2))∑
i=j−(g(0,x1))
|µi(t)− pi|+ errx(xi) + . . .
+ xm
j+(g(xm,xm+1))∑
i=j−(g(xm−1,xm))
|µi(t)− pi|+ errx(xm)
≤
j+(g(x1,x2))∑
i=j−(g(0,x1))
|µi(t)− pi|+ errx(xi) + . . .
+
j+(g(xm,xm+1))∑
i=j−(g(xm−1,xm))
|µi(t)− pi|+ errx(xm)
≤ 2mfmaxL2α/2n−αT . (10)
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Let y∗ = argmaxx∈Lm,T U(x). By Assumption (1) we have
U(x∗)− U(y∗) ≤ mfmaxL2α/2n−αT .
Then, using the definition of the set Sc, which denotes the set of suboptimal bundles of contracts, for
any x ∈ Sc, we have
U(y∗)− U(x) > (β −mfmaxL2α/2)Ln−αT = 4mfmaxL2α/2n−αT .
Since by (10) the estimated payoff of any bundle x ∈ Lm,T is within 2mfmaxL2α/2n−αT of its true value,
the event ξt implies that for any x ∈ Sc
Uˆt(x) ≤ Uˆt(y∗),
which means
ξt ⊂ {Uˆt(x) ≤ Uˆt(y∗),∀x ∈ Sc},
and
{Uˆt(x) > Uˆt(y∗) for some x ∈ Sc} ⊂ ξct .
Therefore
P (x(t) ∈ Sc) ≤ P
(
nT−1⋃
i=1
{|µi(t)− pi| > (β −mfmaxL2
α/2)n−αT
4nTm
}
)
≤
nT−1∑
i=1
P
(
|µi(t)− pi| > (β −mfmaxL2
α/2)n−αT
4nTm
)
≤ 2nT e
−f2maxL22αN(t)
n
2+2α
T ,
by using a Chernoff-Hoeffding bound. Using the last result in (7), we get∑
x∈Sc
(U(x∗)− U(x))E [Tx(T )] ≤ 2nT
T∑
t=1
e
−f2maxL22αN(t)
n
2+2α
T . (11)
We get the main result by substituting (6) and (11) into (5).
The following corollary gives a sublinear regret result for a special case of parameters.
Corollary 1: When the cost of offering n contracts simultaneously, i.e., c(n) ≤ nγ , for all 0 < n < T ,
for some γ > 0, the regret of the seller that runs TLVO with
nT =
⌊
(fmaxL2
α/2)
2
4+2α
(
T
log T
) 1
4+2α
⌋
,
z(t) =
(
1
fmaxL2α/2
) 2+6α
2+α
(
T
log T
) 2+2α
4+2α
log t,
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where byc is the largest integer smaller than equal to y, is upper bounded by
R(T ) ≤ 5m(fmaxL2α/2)
2
2+α (log T )
α
4+2αT
4+α
4+2α
+
(
1
fmaxL2α/2
) 2+6α
2+α
(log T )
2+γ
4+2αT
2+2α+γ
4+2α
+ 2(fmaxL2
α/2)
1
2+α (log T + 1)(log T )
1
4+2αT
1
4+2α .
Hence
R(T ) = O(mT (2+2α+γ)/(4+2α)(log T )2/(4+2α)),
which is sublinear in T for γ < 2.
Proof: We want
e
−f2maxL22αN(t)
n
2+2α
T ≤ 1
t
.
For this,we should have
−f2maxL22αN(t)
n2+2αT
≤ − log t,
which implies
N(t) ≥ (nT )
2+2α
f2maxL
22α
log t. (12)
Note that at each time t either N(t) ≥ z(t) or z(t)− 1 ≤ N(t) < z(t) so we chose
z(t) =
(nT )
2+2α
f2maxL
22α
log t+ 1.
Note that z(t) in this form depends on nT which we have not fixed yet. To have minimum regret, we
need to balance the first and second terms of the regret given in Theorem 1. Thus T/nT ≈ N(T )nT .
Since nT must be an integer, substituting (12) into N(T ), we have
nT =
⌊
(fmaxL2
α/2)
2
4+2α
(
T
log T
) 1
4+2α
⌋
.
Proof is completed by substituting these into the result of Theorem 1.
V. A LEARNING ALGORITHM WITH FIXED NUMBER OF OFFERS
One drawback of TLVO is that in exploration steps it simultaneously offers nT − 1 contracts, and this
number increases sublinearly with T . Usually, the seller will offer different bundles of contracts but it
will include same number of contracts in each bundle. For example, a wireless service provider usually
adds new data plans by removing one of the current data plans, thus the total number of data plans
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Fig. 6. bundles of m contracts offered in exploration steps l = 1, 2, . . . , l′ in an exploration phase
offered does not change significantly over time. In this section, we are interested in the case when the
seller is limited to offering m contracts at every time step.
In this case, the exploration step of TLVO will not work. Because of this, we propose the algorithm
type learning with fixed number of offers (TLFO) that always offers m contracts simultaneously. TLFO
differs from TLVO only in its exploration phase. Each exploration phase of TLFO lasts multiple time
steps. Instead of simultaneously offering nT −1 uniformly spaced contracts at an exploration step, TLFO
has an exploration phase of d(nT − 1)/(m− 2)e steps indexed by l = 1, 2, . . . , d(nT − 1)/(m− 2)e. The
idea behind TLFO is to estimate the buyer’s type distribution from the estimates of the segments of the
buyer’s type distribution over different time steps of the same exploration phase. Let time t be the start
of an exploration phase for TLFO. Let l′ = d(nT − 1)/(m− 2)e denote the last step of the exploration
phase. Next, we define the following bundles of m contracts. The overlapping portions of these bundles
are shown in Figure 6 for l = 1, 2, . . . , l′.
B1 =
{
1
nT
,
2
nT
, . . . ,
m
nT
}
,
B˜1 =
{
1
nT
,
2
nT
, . . . ,
m− 1
nT
}
,
Bl′ =
{
nT −m
nT
,
nT −m+ 1
nT
, . . . ,
nT − 1
nT
}
,
B˜l′ =
{
(l′ − 1)m− 2(l′ − 1) + 2
nT
,
(l′ − 1)m− 2(l′ − 1) + 3
nT
, . . . ,
nT − 1
nT
}
,
and for l ∈ {2, . . . , l′ − 1}
Bl =
{
(l − 1)m− 2(l − 1) + 1
nT
,
(l − 1)m− 2(l − 1) + 2
nT
, . . . ,
lm− 2(l − 1)
nT
}
,
B˜l =
{
(l − 1)m− 2(l − 1) + 2
nT
,
(l − 1)m− 2(l − 1) + 3
nT
, . . . ,
lm− 2(l − 1)− 1
nT
}
.
17
Similar to TLVO let N and Nk, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nT − 1} be the counters that are used to form type
distribution estimates which are set to zero initially. Basically, at an exploitation phase the estimates
µk = Nk/N are formed based on the current values of Nk and N . Different from the analysis of TLVO,
N(t) which is the value of counter N at time t represents the number of completed exploration phases
by time t, not the number of exploration steps by time t. The condition N(t) < z(t) is checked at the
end of each exploration phase or exploitation phase, and if the condition is true, a new exploration phase
starts. In the first exploration step of the exploration phase, TLFO offers the bundle B1. If a contract
k/nT ∈ B˜1 is accepted, Nk is incremented by one. In the lth exploration step, l ∈ {2, . . . , l′−1}, it offers
the bundle Bl. If a contract k/nT ∈ B˜l is accepted, Nk is incremented by one. In the last exploration
step l′, it offers Bl′ . If a contract k/nT ∈ B˜l′ is accepted, Nk is incremented by one. At the time t′ when
all the exploration steps in the exploration phase are completed, N is incremented by one. Pseudocode
of the exploration phase for TLFO is given in Figure 7.
Exploration phase of TLFO.
1: for l = 1, 2, . . . , d(nT − 1)/(m− 2)e do
2: Offer bundle Bl.
3: Let k/nT ∈ Bl be the accepted contract. Get reward k/nT .
4: if k/nT ∈ B˜l then
5: ++Nk
6: end if
7: ++ t
8: end for
9: ++N
Fig. 7. pseudocode of the exploration phase of TLFO
Note that regret of the seller in this case is upper bounded by
R(T ) ≤
∑
x∈S
(Us(x
∗)− Us(x))E [Tx(T )]
+
∑
x∈Sc
(Us(x
∗)− Us(x))E [Tx(T )]
+N(T )d(nT − 1)/(m− 2)e(U(x∗)). (13)
By the exploration phase of TLFO, the accuracy of the estimates µi(t) at the beginning of each exploitation
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phase is the same as TLVO. Moreover, the the regret due to near-optimal exploitations can be upper
bounded by the same term as in TLVO. Only the regret due to explorations changes. The number of
exploration steps of TLFO is about (nT −1)/(m−2) times the number of exploration steps of TLVO, but
there is no cost of offering more than m (possibly a large number of) contracts in TLFO. The following
theorem and corollary gives an upper bound on the regret of TLFO, by using an approach similar to the
proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
Theorem 2: The regret of seller using TLFO with time horizon T is upper bounded by
R(T ) ≤ 5mfmaxL2α/2n−αT (T −N(T )) +N(T )
(
nT − 1
m− 2 + 1
)
U(x∗)
+ 2nT
T∑
t=1
e
−f2maxL22αN(t)
n
2+2α
T .
Since TLFO simultaneously offers m contracts both in explorations and exploitations, its regret does
not depend on the cost function c(.) of offering multiple contracts simultaneously. Therefore our sublinear
regret bound always holds independent of c(.).
Corollary 2: When the seller runs TLFO with time horizon T and
nT =
⌊
(fmaxL2
α/2)
2
4+2α
(
T
log T
) 1
4+2α
⌋
,
z(t) =
(
1
fmaxL2α/2
) 2+6α
2+α
(
T
log T
) 2+2α
4+2α
log t,
we have
R(T ) = Cm +mT
(3+2α)/(4+2α)(log T )2/(4+2α),
uniformly over T for some constant Cm > 0. Hence,
R(T ) = O(mT (3+2α)/(4+2α)(log T )2/(4+2α)).
VI. DISCUSSION
A contract design problem for a secondary spectrum market is studied in [12]. In this work the authors
assume that the type distribution f(θ) is known by the seller, and they characterize the optimal set of
contracts. They show that when the channel condition is common to all types, i.e., probability that the
channel is idle is the same for all types of users, a computationally efficient procedure exists for choosing
the best bundle of m contracts out of Lm,T . This procedure can be used by the seller to efficiently solve
(4).
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In the fixed number of offers case, we assume that at each time step the seller offers a bundle
(x1, x2, . . . , xm) ⊂ Xm ⊂ [0, 1]m. Therefore, the strategy set is a subset of the m-dimensional unit
cube. Because of this relation, we can compare the performance of our contract learning algorithms with
bandit algorithms for high dimensional strategy sets. For example, if the reward from any bundle x were
of linear form, i.e., U(x) = C · x for some C ∈ Rm, then the online stochastic linear optimization
algorithm in [8] would give regret O((m log T )3/2
√
T ). However, in our problem U(x) is not a linear
function, thus this approach will not work. One can also show that in general U(x) is neither convex or
nor concave, therefore any bandit algorithm exploiting these properties will not work in our setting.
Another work, [13], considers online linear optimization in a general topological space. For an m-
dimensional strategy space, they prove a lower bound of O˜(T (m+1)/(m+2)). Therefore, our bound is
better than their lower bound for m > 2 + 2α. This is not a contradiction since in our problem it is the
type θ that is drawn independently at each time step, not the rewards of the individual contracts, and we
focus on estimating the expected rewards of arms (bundles of contracts) from the type distribution. In
the same paper, a O˜(
√
T ) regret upper bound is also proved, under the assumption that the mean reward
function is locally equivalent to a bi-Ho¨lder function near any maxima, i.e., ∃c1, c2, 0 > 0 such that for
||x− x′|| ≤ 0
c1||x− x′||α ≤ |U(x)− U(x′)| ≤ c2||x− x′||α.
However, in this paper, we only require a Ho¨lder condition for the boundaries of the acceptance regions
(see Assumption 1), which implies that
|U(x)− U(x′)| ≤ c3||x− x′||α,
for some c3 > 0 and ∀x,x′ ∈ Xm.
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